Moderator - Agree with the writer, this is
the way to narrow down the issues. If it is the size,
then it on the table, but if it is existence, then the
Arab states have to pinch themselves and wake up into a
real world. CAVEAT:
One thing we need to ponder as the world Citizens - if
other nations accept the refugees, then we may be
opening the doors of legitimacy for nations that will
throw son of the soils. Moving Jews out of Germany
legitimized Germany's illegal crimes of throwing out her
own citizens. That is a precedent,
should we subscribe to this
value?
On
the Jewish Question
By BERNARD LEWIS
November 26, 2007; Page A21, WSJ
Moderator: Agree with the writer one hundred percent
with one caveat to ponder about:
Herewith some thoughts about tomorrow's Annapolis peace
conference, and the larger problem of how to approach
the Israel-Palestine conflict. The first question (one
might think it is obvious but apparently not) is, "What
is the conflict about?" There are basically two
possibilities: that it is about the size of Israel, or
about its existence.
If the issue is about the size of Israel, then we have a
straightforward border problem, like Alsace-Lorraine or
Texas. That is to say, not easy, but possible to solve
in the long run, and to live with in the meantime.
If, on the other hand, the issue is the existence of
Israel, then clearly it is insoluble by negotiation.
There is no compromise position between existing and not
existing, and no conceivable government of Israel is
going to negotiate on whether that country should or
should not exist.
PLO and other Palestinian spokesmen have, from time to
time, given formal indications of recognition of Israel
in their diplomatic discourse in foreign languages. But
that's not the message delivered at home in Arabic, in
everything from primary school textbooks to political
speeches and religious sermons. Here the terms used in
Arabic denote, not the end of hostilities, but an
armistice or truce, until such time that the war against
Israel can be resumed with better prospects for success.
Without genuine acceptance of Israel's right to exist as
a Jewish State, as the more than 20 members of the Arab
League exist as Arab States, or the much larger number
of members of the Organization of the Islamic Conference
exist as Islamic states, peace cannot be negotiated.
A good example of how this problem affects negotiation
is the much-discussed refugee question. During the
fighting in 1947-1948, about three-fourths of a million
Arabs fled or were driven (both are true in different
places) from Israel and found refuge in the neighboring
Arab countries. In the same period and after, a slightly
greater number of Jews fled or were driven from Arab
countries, first from the Arab-controlled part of
mandatory Palestine (where not a single Jew was
permitted to remain), then from the Arab countries where
they and their ancestors had lived for centuries, or in
some places for millennia. Most Jewish refugees found
their way to Israel.
What happened was thus, in effect, an exchange of
populations not unlike that which took place in the
Indian subcontinent in the previous year, when British
India was split into India and Pakistan. Millions of
refugees fled or were driven both ways -- Hindus and
others from Pakistan to India, Muslims from India to
Pakistan. Another example was Eastern Europe at the end
of World War II, when the Soviets annexed a large piece
of eastern Poland and compensated the Poles with a slice
of eastern Germany. This too led to a massive refugee
movement -- Poles fled or were driven from the Soviet
Union into Poland, Germans fled or were driven from
Poland into Germany.
The Poles and the Germans, the Hindus and the Muslims,
the Jewish refugees from Arab lands, all were resettled
in their new homes and accorded the normal rights of
citizenship. More remarkably, this was done without
international aid. The one exception was the Palestinian
Arabs in neighboring Arab countries.
The government of Jordan granted Palestinian Arabs a
form of citizenship, but kept them in refugee camps. In
the other Arab countries, they were and remained
stateless aliens without rights or opportunities,
maintained by U.N. funding. Paradoxically, if a
Palestinian fled to Britain or America, he was eligible
for naturalization after five years, and his
locally-born children were citizens by birth. If he went
to Syria, Lebanon or Iraq, he and his descendants
remained stateless, now entering the fourth or fifth
generation.
The reason for this has been stated by various Arab
spokesmen. It is the need to preserve the Palestinians
as a separate entity until the time when they will
return and reclaim the whole of Palestine; that is to
say, all of the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and Israel.
The demand for the "return" of the refugees, in other
words, means the destruction of Israel. This is highly
unlikely to be approved by any Israeli government.
There are signs of change in some Arab circles, of a
willingness to accept Israel and even to see the
possibility of a positive Israeli contribution to the
public life of the region. But such opinions are only
furtively expressed. Sometimes, those who dare to
express them are jailed or worse. These opinions have as
yet little or no impact on the leadership.
Which brings us back to the Annapolis summit. If the
issue is not the size of Israel, but its existence,
negotiations are foredoomed. And in light of the past
record, it is clear that is and will remain the issue,
until the Arab leadership either achieves or renounces
its purpose -- to destroy Israel. Both seem equally
unlikely for the time being.
Mr. Lewis, professor emeritus at Princeton, is the
author, most recently, of "From Babel to Dragomans:
Interpreting the Middle East" (Oxford University Press,
2004).
URL for this article:
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB119604260214503526.html
